Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 37 | Issue 2

2006

NSA Wiretapping Controversy
David D. Cole
Ruth Wedgwood

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
David D. Cole and Ruth Wedgwood, NSA Wiretapping Controversy, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 509 (2006)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

NSA WIRETAPPING CONTROVERSY *
A Debate between ProfessorDavidD. Cole and ProfessorRuth Wedgwood
Moderators:
Associate Dean Hiram Chodosh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and
Joseph C. Hostetler-Baker & Hostetler Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law; Dean-Designate, S.J. Quinney College
of Law, University of Utah.
Professor Michael P. Scharf, Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K.
Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
2005 Nobel Peace Prize nominee,
Professor Amos Guiora, Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Global Security Law and Policy, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Lt. Col.
(Ret.) Israel Defense Forces, Judge Advocate General's Corps,
Professor Jessie Hill, Assistant Professor and Assistant Director, Institute for
Global Security Law and Policy, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law,
Professor Jonathan Adler, Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, and
Professor Raymond Ku, Professor of Law and Associate Director, Center for
Law, Technology, and the Arts
Participants:
Professor David D. Cole, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Professor Ruth Wedgwood, Edward B. Burling Professor of International
Law and Diplomacy; Director of the International Law and Organization

* Mock Congressional Hearing Sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International Law
Center and the Institute for Global Security Law and Policy on Thursday, February 9, 2006.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 37:509

Program, Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C.
PROFESSOR MICHAEL SCHARF:
We are about to begin this very innovative Mock Congressional
Hearing. We will be simulating the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, a
committee that just met earlier this week on Monday and heard testimony
from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales on this very issue. Surprisingly,
the Attorney General refused and the committee did not require that he be
sworn in; a very extraordinary circumstance. That testimony was fairly onesided; there were not other witnesses; it was fairly short.
So today we are going to see what the real testimony would have
been like had we had a balanced approach and a more in-depth examination
of the issue. This actually foreshadows other Senate hearings that are likely
to come in the next five or six weeks. So I think the world is sort of tuned in
to Cleveland, Ohio today to see what happens.
Well, I will be playing the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Arlen Specter. To my right will be Senator Ray Ku, a professor from
Case who specializes in cyber-crime and other things dealing with the Internet and Fourth Amendment rights and he is from the great State of Ohio. To
his right is Senator Jesse Hill representing the State of New York; Professor
Hill was an ACLU litigator in New York City before she came here. She
will bring interesting insights from that point of view. You have already met
Senator Hiram Chodosh. I'll put you out in California. And at the far end is
Senator John Adler. Professor Adler is a constitutional law professor here.
He is nationally known for his work in constitutional issues and he will be
representing the State of Pennsylvania. And the person I just skipped over, I
did so on purpose, he is co-sponsoring this event. It is Senator Amos Guiora
from the State of Michigan. And he is going to introduce the two expert
panelists that we have brought from Washington D.C. to make this a really
exciting and interesting event.
PROFESSOR AMOS GUIORA:
Thank you, Senator Scharf. I will begin with Professor Ruth
Wedgwood. It is an honor to have you with us today. She is a very distinguished professor at the Advanced International Studies program at Johns
Hopkins. I have had the pleasure of appearing on a panel with her. Thank
you for joining us.
Her co-debater is Professor David Cole from Georgetown University. Professor Cole has been called by the journalist, Anthony Lewis, "one
of the great liberal voices in America today." Professor Cole, it is also a
pleasure to have you with us today.
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PROFESSOR SCHARF:
Now the ground rules for this Senate hearing are as follows: We
will begin with a fifteen minute presentation from Professor Cole, followed
by a fifteen minute presentation from Professor Wedgwood. Then each of
the senators in the order in which we are seated will grill the expert witnesses and we have five minutes total for our questions and answers.
Without further ado, let's begin the hearing with the presentation of
Professor David Cole.
PROFESSORDAVID COLE:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, let me make a few opening remarks about how this is different from a real Congressional Hearing; for those of you who have not spent
as much time in Washington as I have. The first way in which this is different from a real Congressional Hearing is that the senators are actually all
present. At most hearings, at least the ones that I have testified at, by the
time I testified in the event, there might be one senator left, otherwise its
staff members that you talk to. So I am grateful to have you all here.
The second way in which this is different is that we are now ten
minutes into the program and you are actually hearing from the witnesses.
In a usual Senate hearing you first, have opening statements by each of the
senators which is the most important part of the hearing where they get to
pontificate for ten minutes or so, so that they get their sound bytes in and
the witnesses are merely a prop for the senators. So this is, I would say, an
improved version of the Senate Committee Hearing.
Let me begin by saying what this debate is not about, or what this
hearing is not about. I think it is not about ultimately the question of
whether the President should be listening in on phone calls by Al-Qaeda and
members of supporting or affiliate organizations. It is not, I think, about the
issues of privacy and Fourth Amendment, for the most part, for a couple of
reasons. One, we do not know the scope of this program at this point and so
it is hard to make judgments about whether its scope violates or entrenches
upon Fourth Amendment privacy concerns.
Two, most Americans and probably most Senators agree that we
should be listening in when Al-Qaeda calls. So there is not any dispute
about that. In addition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,' the statute that is at issue here, does not prohibit the government from listening in
1 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (2000).
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on any call made by a member of Al-Qaeda from outside the United States.
As long as the surveillance is targeted at the Al-Qaeda member outside the
United States and the information is acquired through a tap outside the
United States, there is no law that limits the President in any way, shape or
form from collecting that information. So it is a red herring when the defenders of this program say, well, we should be listening in to members of
Al-Qaeda. That is not what the debate is about.
So, what is the debate about? The debate is about whether we
should be doing that pursuant to the law or whether we should be doing
pursuant to Executive fiat, under an understanding of the Constitution that
allows the President to order that Federal statutes be violated in secret.
Now, is it a debate about the command, or scope of the commander-in-chief
power? It is a debate about separation of powers and checks and balances.
That is what is ultimately at issue here.
So let me set the stage, briefly, by describing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2 what it does and what it does not do, and then turn
to the two asserted basis, both, I think, fundamentally flawed for the asserted legality of this program.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted in the late
1970s after a committee, a special committee of Congress called the Church
Committee, revealed massive, widespread violations of American's rights
by surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency and by other
agencies on thousands and thousands of innocent Americans.
The response was to say, let's regulate the gathering of foreign intelligence information. We regulate it by passing a law enacted by Congress
signed by the President which permits foreign intelligence electronic surveillance for national security purposes but requires, that in most cases, the
President must go to a court and make a showing that there is a justified
basis for gathering that electronic surveillance, namely, probable cause and
that the individual targeted, if he is a U.S. person within the United States,
is an agent of a foreign power or a terrorist organization. You do not have to
show a crime. You do not have to show probable cause of criminal activity,
just probable cause that the person is connected to the terrorist organization.
Congress sought to make clear that this was the way to do it. They
provided in 18 U.S.C. Section 2511, 3 that this is the exclusive means by
which electronic surveillance may be conducted. They went further in Section 1809 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 4 and said it is a crime
to conduct foreign intelligence beyond the scope-to collect electronic surveillance beyond the scope of this exclusive means. And, this is the most
2

Id.

3

18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000).

4
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important point; they specifically addressed the question of authorization
during war time. Under Section 1811 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 5 they provide that when Congress declares war, the President
shall have fifteen days to conduct warrantless wiretapping. And the ideal
was-and they specifically set this forth in the ledger, if the President needs
more authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping, he could come to us and
ask for it and we can amend FISA to give him that authority, but fifteen
days and no longer, if he does not come to us and ask for further authority.
Now, in this instance, the President decided in the face of that statute-the statute says that this is the only way to do it. It is a crime to do it
any other way and if you want broader authority, come to us and seek an
amendment to FISA. The President decided not to come to Congress, not to
seek an amendment to FISA, instead, to order, in secret, the conduct that is
criminal on its face go forward.
What is the administration's defense of the program? They have
two. The first one is frivolous. The second one is extremely dangerous.
The first one is that Congress, somehow and without saying so, in
authorizing the use of military force against Al-Qaeda on September 14,
2001, somehow implicitly overrode FISA and gave the President unlimited
authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping of Americans. That argument
is frivolous, I suggest, because when you put the authorization to use the
military force, which says not one word about warrantless wiretapping, up
along side Section 1811,6 the provision I referred to earlier, its title, Authorization During Wartime, it is clear that the authorization to use military
force cannot provide the authority the government suggests that it does.
Why? Because if Congress says that even when we declare war, a more
serious and grave step than authorizing the use of military force, you get
fifteen days and no longer. How can it be that when they enact an authorization to use the military and do not declare war you somehow now get unlimited authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping?
In addition, when Alberto Gonzales was asked, why we did not go
to Congress and ask specifically for this authority, he said, well, we talked
to some members of the Congress about doing that and they said it would be
difficult if not impossible to get it. And so, he did not go. And he later
sought to backtrack and said, what I really meant is that it would be difficult, but not impossible, to without compromising the program. But the
critical point here is that they thought about going to Congress and asking
for it and decided not to. How can you argue, on the one hand, we did not
go to Congress and ask for it because we were concerned that we could not

'
6

50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
Id.
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get it? But on the other hand, Congress gave it to us without ever having
said so. That is the frivolous argument.
The dangerous argument is the back-up argument the administration
relies upon and that is the Commander-in-Chief authority. And here the
argument is that FISA is unconstitutional to the extent that it restricts the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, in gathering signal intelligence on AlQaeda. And the reason for that is that the Commander-in-Chief authority,
the government argues, the President argues, gives the President uncheckable authority to choose the means and methods of engaging the enemy.
Those are the Justice Department's words, the means and the methods of
engaging the enemy. And the claim is anything that falls within that paradigm, means and methods of engaging the enemy, cannot be restricted by
statute. And therefore, to the extent that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act says, you cannot wiretap Americans in the United States without
justification, without going to court because that interferes, in the President's mind, with engaging the enemy is unconstitutional.
Now, to me this is a resurrection of the Nixon doctrine. Richard
Nixon famously argued, in defending a situation in which he authorized
illegal warrantless wiretapping of Americans during the Vietnam war. He
argued if the President does it that means it is not illegal. Now, President
Nixon learned that is not the American doctrine; that was President Nixon's
doctrine. That was part of the Articles of Impeachment. He, ultimately, was
the forced to resign. President Bush has, essentially, resurrected the Nixon
doctrine with one modification. He says that if the President does it and says
the magic words, "Commander-in-Chief" it is not illegal.
Now, what is wrong with this argument? First, let me say, this is not
the first time the government-the President-made this argument. The
Justice Department made this argument regarding enemy combatants. And
three justices dissented, but they said we just read the statute differently but
Congress certainly could, if it wanted to, extend these limitations to the
President. Similarly, the court in the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 7 case involving the
U.S. citizen enemy combatant rejected similar arguments that constitutionally, the courts could not review the factual basis for the President's designation of the U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant.
8
The Supreme Court in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer
case in 1952 rejected the same claim when President Truman made it to
justify the seizure of the steel mills. The Supreme Court in 1804 rejected the
same claim in the Little v. Berreme9 case, in which the President asserted
that he could order that ships coming from France be seized when Congress
7 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

8 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
9 Little v. Berreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804).

2006]

NSA WIRETAPPING CONTROVERSY

had only authorized that ships going to France be seized. In fact, no case, no
case has upheld the startlingly broad assertion of authority that is at the bottom of President Bush's order in this case.
But then, again, I suppose, what are a few negative Supreme Court
decisions when, in your view, it is the President, not the Supreme Court
who has the power to say what the law is.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR RUTH WEDGWOOD:
It is a pleasure to be here and to meet my good friend, David Cole,
again on another issue. We are, I think, just for clarity doing some degree a
mock hearing. So we do not necessarily believe everything we say. But we
must state, as intelligent human beings, the most colorful arguments. I will
not believe most of what I say. And there is a proviso that says this is an
issue where we are all working through the problems and the quickseties of
it that it is going to take a while for the country and probably any good-faith
person to come to a final moment of resolution of the bottom line.
Let me bring to your attention several things that David has, perhaps, elected to emphasize. Partly, this is a problem we have to approach in
a rush-among fashion, which end of the elephant do you start with? But the
difference now from 1978, when I, shortly thereafter had the pleasure of
meeting the Carter Justice Department, is that there are problems we did not
ever suppose that we would face. Americans clearly have very, very high
expectations of privacy. That is why, as a lass, I worked on FBI guidelines
with Judge Webster and Attorney General Griffin Bell. Americans want to
know that they are safe in their homes and they have the rich, autonomous,
private life that nobody can intrude on.
But at the same time in 1978, we were not thinking about anything
like Al-Qaeda, a cyber entity that began to mimic the powers of a nation
state in a situation where deterrence has failed. The second strike capability
that kept the U.S. safe in the Cold War, where if the Soviets attacked us,
they knew we could retaliate against Moscow or military targets near Moscow and, therefore, thank goodness, nuclear weapons were never, in fact,
used. And everybody had a great sense of caution about them.
[Al Qaeda is] a different enemy in the sense that it is not an organized nation-state. We do not know its address. You do not know who its
players are. You are not watching the front door of the Soviet embassy in a
way that you can identify everybody who is likely to be a Soviet agent. You
really face a very different kind of circumstance. An adversary that does
not, itself, follow the rules of war; which attacks civilians deliberately;
which all of us would agree is a form of terrorism and a kind of war
crime-and really a technological change. We are old enough, but we date
ourselves, to not have always had handheld computers or laptop or desk
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computers. And the kind of capacity, dare one would call it, agility that an
adversary may have, you could really use electronics in a fulsome way is
something that really was not contemplated in 1978.
Now, what is wrong with FISA? FISA was, in fact, a very, very
good-faith attempt to capture what was thought to be needed by the Executive at that time and place. It followed a period when, in fact, there had been
abuses. No one wants to go back to the period of using foreign intelligent
powers or domestic intelligent powers for political purposes, whether it is
LBJ or President Nixon. The White House incumbents were often too easily
tempted to make use of their powers for purposes that were not worthy.
FISA does a couple of things. It tries to capture what you might
need, tactically and strategically, against your adversaries. It uses the probable cause standard, which you are familiar with from criminal law. But it is
not probable cause to believe that a crime is about to be committed, probable cause to believe you are an adversary. Nobody, even in criminal law
classes, could quite capture what probable cause means. Is it fifty percent; is
it thirty-three percent? It is certainly not one percent. And that may begin to
give you a sense of the conceivable problems that were posed in regards to
catastrophic harm by unidentified adversaries. A one percent chance that
somebody might be intending to explode or hide a radiological bomb or
nuclear devise. You do not get to multiply the percent times the harm when
you are determining the nature of probable cause. Yet FISA uses just that
standard for probable cause. It is hard to meet.
David has never had the pleasure of working as a prosecutor. The
problem that prosecutors find the first day on the job is that if you need
probable cause to get probable cause, how do you get probable cause? Probable cause does not grow on trees. You have to know a lot about a person
before you can generate probable cause that you need to get a wiretap. And
you sometimes do it in ways that will escape the attention of the Supreme
Court whether it is gathering garbage on the curb or talking to their friends
who give you voluntary interviews. But there are cases where you cannot go
forward because probable cause is a significant threshold requirement. And
it really is not much more than a hunch, intuition, a belief, or even a wellfounded belief, but that one that only buys us say two, five or ten percent
probability. Now again, of the situation of wartime, even low probabilities
of catastrophic harm might seem to you to be unacceptable.
FISA protects several classes of people and to think about how
these would work under practical terms. It covers any kind of intentional
targeting of a known U.S. person if the communication comes from abroad
or goes abroad. A U.S. person is a citizen or permanent resident alien. It
also protects any interception of a communication of any person in the U.S.
if the acquisition occurs in the territorial U.S. So, say, if you had two people
who snuck in over the Mexican border, illegal aliens that have only been
here for twenty-four hours, and they are communicating within the territory
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of the U.S., nonetheless, FISA would plug in. And it also covers any kind of
physical intrusion, sort of either a black bag job or room bug that is in the
U.S.
Now, let me give you a couple instances where I think this creates
problems. And we do not know for sure, but what we do know, we do not
know much more now than we did a week ago, about what the government
says this particular program was about. But let me give you one example
that goes beyond what has been stated in the hearings that were troubling.
This has to do with a skipping stone. You might well want to follow a
communication with Al-Qaeda, sent from abroad, from Afghanistan to Chicago and follow it to Cleveland and then to New York and then to Miami.
You might want to know, simply by the frequency and the periodicity of
who is calling whom, what might be the likely network, or spiderweb of
people who are associated with Al-Qaeda.
But under FISA, if you apply FISA strictly speaking, you could not
follow that skein any farther than the first communication from Afghanistan
to Detroit. And the question would be, does the President, if he is acting in
good faith-it is your President, the guy you vote for next time, President
Clinton, part two, whoever. Would you want to allow that president, whom
you like, whom you trust, to follow that spiderweb skein? Or would you
want to simply be limited by the statutory provision of probable cause and
take your chances on the consequential damages?
You are going to have situations where communications that formerly were not covered are newly covered because we now have a different
technology where they are now using broadband technology, fiber optics
where the acquisition will technically be in the U.S. whereas, 25 years ago
the method of communication and therefore the acquisition point would
have been outside the U.S. Because the technological change, with no
change in the personality of the actors things will not fall under FISA that
formerly did not.
Now the case that Attorney General Gonzales was talking about in
his later descriptions, were phone calls where one member of the conversation is associated with Al-Qaeda and one end of the conversation is abroad,
either calling or receiving.
In regard to communications that deal with border boundaries, think
back to the original idea of what the Fourth Amendment would protect. The
Fourth Amendment was meant to credit and cherish reasonable expectations
of privacy. When you go across a border, your bags are searched. Of course,
you are searched at the airport. When your packages are sent in or out they
can be searched. If you are looking at what kind of expectation of privacy
you have, the fact that it involves foreign territory may be very, very pertinent to the sense of whether there was a constitutional violation or not.
Now, one complaint that is made is if you have any quarrel with the
techniques or technical details of the FISA act, go to Congress and ask them
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to change it. That may well be a possible means. It is also true, however, as
LBJ taught us, as he said in counsel with Martin Luther King, legislative
moments are very hard to come by. The times that are any way near the
election cycle, people get into very polarized positions. People cannot be
seen talking to each other. So, you not only have the problem that a legislative change might, in fact, reveal details of the program, but it may well be
that because of the, if you will, ambition of political parties to save issues
for elections that they may not be prepared to address it yet.
And one example that actually comes from the 1970s an old civil
liberties intelligence hand told me this story. It was known in the mid 1970s
that the government from time to time would engage in several black bag
jobs, physical searches of people thought to be foreign agents. And yet, that
was not added to the FISA act when it was passed in 1978. And one account
is that some people thought that if it was put in the statute it would happen
too often. Therefore, leave it on the simple justification of Executive power,
hoping that that would induce the kind of caution. That was a critique from
the left. They did not want it, I am told, in the statute because they thought it
would be used too frequently. And yet, they knew the problem. Congress
was not willing to address it further at that point.
Now, you all are law students so you have come across the phrase,
"occupation of the field". Have you ever heard that funny phrase? Well,
Congress passes a statute. Should you suppose they mean it as the exclusive
method of doing something, whether it is federal versus state or Congressional versus Executive, occupation of the field? I do think that when you
look at a statute, one that changes circumstances in particular, you have to
entertain the idea of a dynamic occupation of the field. It could be that in
1978, Congress meant the FISA statute to be the only way of getting a foreign intelligence wiretap. But the question you ought to ask is, would Congress have meant that if they knew the changes that they would face vis-Avis technology, the kind of adversary, the kind of use of the Internet? And
that is a much harder question to answer, I think.
We have had dynamic interpretations of many, many statutes. We
have had dynamic interpretations of the Constitution. The Air Force is not
unconstitutional, even though it was not mentioned in Article 1, Section 8 of
the enumerated powers of Congress, because we have reasoned that Congress would have wanted to have an Air Force, if they had known Leonardo's dream of flying would ever have come to pass. So we read it into the
Constitution. And the same thing is true of theories of occupation of the
field.
The other question you might ask yourself is kind of a functional
question. What would you have a court to do, if, in fact, the way to determine if somebody is an associate of Al-Qaeda is to look at the most recent,
updated, dynamically gathered data that you have on how Al-Qaeda members tend to act; how do they make their phone calls? Are they using a
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switchboard in Kandahar? Has it moved to Yemen? Has it moved to Mongolia? Has it moved to Somalia? How many phone calls do you have to
have before you know something is a switchboard? That can get you very
deep into the trade-craft of intelligence.
Now in the case of criminal law, we have courts and judges as the
gatekeepers in almost all circumstances because they do criminal law for a
living. But judges in general, even FISA judges, do not do intelligence in
quite the intense way that the courts take care of criminal law enforcement.
Let me just note two other things, if you will. David would have
you believe that theories of robust Executive power are peculiar to a particular president. That is simply not true. Read the famous Truongt° case
from 1980. The Truong case is otherwise famous for saying that, before
certain changes, a FISA wire had to have, as its primary purpose, the acquisition of foreign intelligence and could not have an ambiguous double purpose of criminal law enforcement and intelligence.
But in Truong the court also said the following: "the separation of
powers requires us to acknowledge the principal responsibility of the President for foreign affairs and competently for foreign intelligence and surveillance."' 1 The needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign
intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform war requirement would unduly frustrate the President in carrying out his foreign
affairs responsibility.
More importantly, the Executive possesses unparalleled expertise to
make the decision whether to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance,
whereas the judiciary is largely inexperienced in making the delicate and
complex decisions that lie behind foreign intelligence surveillance. The
courts are unschooled in diplomacy in military affairs, a mastery of which
would be essential to passing on an Executive Branch request.
And you might also look at an Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC")
opinion, the OLC, from the year 2000 when President Clinton was still in
office. This had to do with whether the President could ever demand that
criminal law enforcement authorities turn over to him information that was
gathered in a criminal wiretap, even though, ordinarily, time of free criminal
wire taps were kept secret. The OLC opinion, written by Randolph D. Moss,
from the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, said the following:
The Constitution vests the President with responsibility over all matters
within the executive branch that bear on national defense and foreign affairs .... Where the President's authority concerning national security or
foreign relations is in tension with a statutory rather than the constitutional
rule, the statue cannot displace the President's constitutional authority and
10 United States v. Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
"

Id. at 914.
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should be read to be "subject to an implied exception in deference to such
presidential powers." We believe that if Title III limited the access of the
President and his aides to information critical to national security or foreign relations, it would be unconstitutional as applied in those circumstances. 12
One point about the authorization to use military force that David
has failed to mention, it shows we are in war. And in a war, the President
can, not only capture people who are enemy combatants, he ought to be able
to overhear them. And this has nothing to do with a counter-intelligence
problem or broader theories of intrusion. If you are fighting a war and on an
American battlefield, you do need some signal intelligence capability and a
court is not necessarily the place to conduct that in the volume or with the
speed that you need to be effective in thwarting a real-time attack that can
have truly catastrophic consequences for innocent civilians.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR SCHARF."
Okay. Now we will begin the questioning. Again, each senator has
five minutes for questions and answers. We have a timekeeper there and we
will scrupulously keep to that timekeeper.
Let me begin with a question for Professor Cole and beginning with
the assumption that the FISA statute allows for unwarranted wiretapping, if
it is authorized by Congress. You had mentioned the Supreme Court case of
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld13 and in that case the Supreme Court recently ruled that
the post 9/11 authorization to use military force had authorized the President
to detain a U.S. citizen in the United States because, "detention to prevent a
combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging
war."

14

So, five Supreme Court justices concluded that the post 9/11 authorization statute, "clearly and unmistakably authorize[s]" the fundamental
incidence of waging war. 15 My question to you, Professor Cole, is why

12

Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice

to the Counsel Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Sharing Title III Electronic Surveillance Material With the Intelligence Community (Oct. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/titleIlfinal.htm [hereinafter Moss Memorandum] (citing Dep't of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) and Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy,
783 F.3d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
13 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
14
15

Id. at 519.
Id.

2006]

NSA WIRETAPPING CONTROVERSY

wouldn't communications intelligence targeted at the enemy be a fundamental incidence of the use of military force?
PROFESSOR COLE:
I think it is but, I think, here is the difference. In Hamdi, the court
was faced with an authorization to use military force, and no competing,
specific, congressional directive on the question of detaining American citizens as enemy combatants during wartime.
In this context, the court would be faced with the same authorization to use military force which says nothing about wiretapping. But here,
unlike with respect to detention, you would have a specific directive from
Congress that says, this is the authority we are going to grant during wartime, and it is fifteen days and no longer. I would posit that had there been a
statute on the books that said, when war is declared the President can detain
American citizens as enemy combatants, but only for fifteen days. And if he
needs greater authority he should come to us and ask us to amend the statute.
There is no way that the Supreme Court would have read the broad
and unspecific authorization to use military force to somehow override that
very specific statute. The rule is that a specific statute governs over a general statute in every circumstance. The situation with respect to detention
was there was no specific statute governing wartime detention of American
citizens as enemy combatants. Here, there is a specific statute and, I think,
that makes this an entirely different situation.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
All right, I will then move to the next of our congressional panel
and that is Senator Ku.
PROFESSOR RA YMOND KU:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here and testifying before us.
Professor Cole, I would like to start with you and ask a question
that, I think, many of us are curious about. It goes along the lines of, even if
one does believe that what the President has done here has violated both
provisions of FISA and, therefore, run into constitutional concerns over the
separation of powers doctrine, as well as, potentially violate the Fourth
Amendment as in probable cause and warrant requirement, required by the
Fourth Amendment, what is the remedy here? We are not talking about an
exclusionary rule solution in which the evidence that is gathered here will
be excluded in the trial of these individuals, nor are we not necessarily talk-
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ing about a civil action under Section 198316 for damages in most of these
instances. So what can Congress and what can the American people expect
in terms of a remedy for this problem?
PROFESSOR COLE:
I think that is a great question. My view is that what is important is
that at the end of the day we restore the notion of checks and balances that
we had before the Bush Administration came to power. And that is ultimately what is most critical here. The way in which the checks and balances
are restored is less critical. So, for example, one way in which checks and
balances could be restored is a censure of the President for violating a
criminal statute and ordering the criminal stature be violated in secret. I do
not think that without knowing anything more, impeachment is appropriate
or prosecution is appropriate, but censure, I think, would be appropriate. It
would be a way for Congress to assert the importance of checks and balances.
Another way of responding might be to cut off funds for this program if Congress determines that the kind of surveillance that is being conducted should not be conducted. And if it determines that some narrower
form of surveillance, but broader than FISA, is appropriate then it should
amend FISA to authorize that. But I think the important point is that Congress must assert its prerogative here, just as it did a month ago in the
McCain amendment' 7 when it learned that the President had ordered, in
secret, that the Torture Convention' 8 be interpreted in such a way that he
could impose cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment on anyone who did
not have a U.S. passport. Congress responded by making it absolutely clear
that he could not exploit that loophole. And the President, despite threatening to veto it, despite sending the Vice President to try to get an exception,
was forced, ultimately, to sign the bill against his will. That, I think, restored some notion of Congressional rule.
PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
Mr. Chairman, since we are both sitting here at the witness table,
can we reply to each other?
16 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
17 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, H.R. Res. 1268, 109th Cong. § 6057(a)(1) (2005), available at
http://www.phrusa.org/research/torture/mccaintext.html.
18 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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PROFESSOR SCHARF:
I think the chairman will exercise his prerogative and allow you to
have a minute of rebuttal.
PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
Not rebuttal, but rather to mur, I suppose. Dismissal is irrelevant if
you know. David, Mr. Cole, my worthy adversary, has conceded in his
opening remarks that the interception of any communication to or from a
person who is a member of, or associated with Al-Qaeda is constitutional,
and it is consistent with FISA, at least, the evidentiary standard of FISA. So
the only complaint seems to be that this was done, not because it was-not
that this was a wrongful search in and of itself, but that the President did not
go to the FISA board. He is not saying that this kind of search violates the
Fourth Amendment. He is simply saying that you had to go to Judge Kotelly
or someone else on the FISA court and ask for the warrant.
So, I would find it most peculiar that David would want to shut
down the program or censure the President, or cut off the funding when it is
just the kind of search he thinks in substance is permissible and, frankly,
surely necessary for national defense.
PROFESSOR COLE:
If I could respond briefly, that is playing with words because, I feel,
no one would accept an argument from a police officer, well, I actually had
probable cause. So, the fact that I searched the house without getting a warrant means that it is constitutional because I would have gotten a warrant if I
had gonePROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
You do not have to get a warrant if it is not practical to get a warrant.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
Here, here. Let's have order in the Congress.
PROFESSOR COLE:
That is not a defense to the violation, number one. Number two, we
do not know the scope of this program. But if the scope of this program
were simply listening in abroad on Al-Qaeda members' calls, the President
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would not have had to make the frivolous and dangerous arguments that he
has made and the only arguments he has made, which interestingly, Ruth
has not defended here today, because he could have simply said, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act does not cover this and so, I am authorized to
do it. There would have been no controversy had that been the scope of the
program.
So, by definition, even though they have not told us what it is, the
very fact that they feel compelled to make this broad assertion of unchecked
Executive power and to make this ridiculous argument that Congress somehow gave them, without saying something, that it specifically denied them
in Section 1811,19 suggests that they are doing more than simply listening to
members of Al-Qaeda.
PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
Am I permitted ....
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
I think we need to move on to the next Senator, who is the Honorable Jessie Hill and the Chair gives you the floor.
PROFESSOR JESSIE HILL:
My question is for Professor Wedgwood. So as I understand much
of your testimony today you are suggesting that FISA is essentially, in many
respects, out of date. The conditions in 1978 do not match the conditions
that we are facing today and that the President, therefore, might need to
exercise his powers to, essentially, as Professor Cole just suggested, ignore
or overstep FISA. And of course, the natural responses is, you mentioned
would be, well, why doesn't Congress simply amend FISA if it is out of
date and as I understand your response to that, it is well, that's hard, essentially. And again, that this is wartime and that the President needs to act. I
am wondering whether there is any authority or any Supreme Court case, in
particular, where the Executive power to act in the face of explicit congressional disapproval has been upheld and, particularly, as Professor Cole
pointed out, in the face of a criminal prohibition.

'9

50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
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PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
Well, the Clinton Administration itself, again, hued closely to the
view that the President has authority to not follow statutes that he, in goodfaith, believes to be unconstitutional and that one President does not preclude another President in that view simply because he signed a statute. But
I think, again, you do not have to go there is my point because a reasonable
construction of what Congress meant in 1978 was not to preclude every
other contingency of changed technology, changed adversary. You have to
read Congress's intention, reasonably.
Secondly, the problem with seeking a one-time Congressional fix is
that statutes are extremely public. They have to be public. What the Federalist Papers do teach you about the need for dispatch secrecy and the Executive is partly because of the absence of our favorite phrase of acoustic separation. You cannot announce it to the public or the Congress when the adversary is listening as well. So, if Congress was to try to specify what algorithm would be sufficient to conclude that somebody is associated with alQaeda, clearly, you would not want al-Qaeda to know that or they would
wear a different color tie or they would make fewer phone calls to al-Qaeda
headquarters. They would find ways of engineering around whatever was
your factually specific predicate.
And the idea of giving this to simply judges is that it is true that the
FISA court has, over time, recruited a number of judges who were interested in intelligence and gained some expertise in it. What we have is an
adversary who really is like quicksilver. Agile does not begin to describe the
capacity for camouflage; vetting communications in an Internet image. The
method of characterizing how you know somebody is a member of al-Qaeda
is quite difficult to capture in any wartime circumstance.
And thirdly, I will quarrel on principle with the idea that it has to be
criminal probable cause because if you were to require a 30 or 40 or 50 percent probability that somebody is associated with al-Qaeda before you could
tap them, that means a 5 to 10 to 15 to 20 percent bad guy, who is intending
extraordinarily harmful measures that will effect thousands of people,
would be beyond your cannon. And in wartime, that would be a heck of a
way to operate as a commander-in-chief.
PROFESSOR HILL:
And if I could just follow on that and tying it, perhaps, back to this
question of remedies, should the information that is gathered in these wiretaps be able to be used to support applications to the FISA court and/or to be
used in criminal cases and if so, is that undermining, in any way, Congress's
intent?
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PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
Well so far, they have not been. The Bush Administration has represented to the FISA court that it is not using any kind of off-FISA method
of obtaining information in order to put together FISA probable cause. If it
were, there has been a big debate again about the wall is the criminal versus
intelligence. Much chagrin a lot of chagrin, if you will, on a number of
sides, but the chagrin that the inability to integrate everything you know to
collect the dots so you can connect them was deeply burdensome in the attempt to safeguard the Fourth Amendment. And the maintenance of the
walls at the moment, are very bad, not simply in Berlin but in Washington,
because it is hard enough to keep up with a quicksilver adversary and the
inability to integrate criminal intelligence collection methods has been a real
detriment in the past.
So one would have to think very carefully, through that problem. If
you do not want to, obviously, have methods used as an evasion to the
Fourth Amendment standards that would otherwise apply if you were really
going after a coke dealer, you do not want to be using your FISA taps or
non-FISA intelligence taps. But the problem of segregating purpose is also a
difficult one.
PROFESSOR HILL:
Thank you.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
Senator Guiora, the floor is now yours.
PROFESSOR GUIORA:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Professor Wedgwood, we've been down the road of an unfettered
Executive many times in American history and each time has been an utter
failure. The FISA amendment allows for a fifteen-day warrantless period. In
many ways, it strikes me that what you are suggesting is allowing the Executive, once again, this unfettered power. The question is whether, in the
context of separation of power, is that something we can truly live with,
particularly in this very tenuous age that we are all living in?
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PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
Well, I think it may depend, in part, on the kind of issue you are
speaking of being that Presidents, going way back, had aides that they later
came to regret-actions they have come to regret.
In the regard to privacy this does not have to do with the physical
integrity of the body. It does not have to do with torture or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment. It is not an entitlement that is even mentioned in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 20 You look at state
practice. Many, many European countries have utterly unregulated intelligence intrusions. We are unusual in the extreme in having this kind of statutory regulation of intelligence surveillance.
So I do think that when you are thinking about the dangers of abuse
versus the importance of avoiding other kinds of abuses like the abuse of
losing 10,000 or 100,000 citizens, that the kind of value that is at stake has
something to do with the issue. There are other ways as John, arguably,
instructed us of providing checks and balances, whether you have a very
robust press, the fourth branch of government. When people are troubled by
something it usually comes to light. But I do not think that you can treat
this-if my friend David Cole is critical of the unitary theory of the executive, I would be equally troubled by the unitary theory of the counterexecutive. You have to take it issue by issue and the practical circumstances
that you are faced with. And in wartime, and this is in every good sense of
the harm, of the danger of catastrophic harm in wartime. In that circumstance, the idea that Franklin Roosevelt would have let a federal judge tell
him who to target or that even Congress could tell you who to target, would
be dismissed. The Commander-in-Chief authority does mean something.
Even state governors, as we know from Article 1, Section 10,21 have war
powers when there is imminent harm that does not admit a delay. So, I just
do not think you can go back to the founding of the republic and dismiss the
real practical concerns that are here by citing opinions, pro or con, of Woodrow Wilson, and/or Abraham Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus. I
would not mix my apples and my oranges in this.
And finally, you do not have to subscribe to the unitary theory of
Executive power if, suppose, that in some circumstances, the Executive
does have inherent power.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
A follow-up?
20

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
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PROFESSOR GUIORA:
I do. To Professor Cole. When you think about balancing in the
context of the situation we are in, how do you see the balance between, if
you will, the courts and the presidency?
PROFESSOR COLE:
I think that the approach that Justice Jackson put forward in the
Youngstown Sheet & Tube 22 case, which has been seen as the guiding approach to the separation of powers since that time, by a majority of the
court, is the appropriate way to look at this question and that is if the President acts with the support of Congress, he is acting at his highest level of
authority and he can go forward. If the President acts where Congress has
been silent, then you are in a twilight zone and, generally, the President,
with the ability to engage in judicia, is going to be upheld. But where the
President acts in contravention of specific statutory dictates, he is acting at
his lowest ebb and he can only take action contrary to Congress if Congress
has no power to regulate the subject.
23
So how does that apply here? Well, Ruth referred to the Truong
case and very broad statements in the Truong case about the President's
inherent power to conduct electronic surveillance, but she did not point out
is when the Truong case was decided, it was talking about the President's
authority before FISA was enacted. Before FISA was enacted, there was a
statute that specifically recognized that the President has inherent power to
conduct foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. So Congress had approved of the President's engaging in warrantless electronic surveillance, he
was at his highest ebb, therefore, and the court, understandably, said that
that would be constitutional.
When FISA was enacted, Congress repealed that provision and instead said, now we are setting the rules here. This is the only way to do it
and it is a crime to do it in any other way. Ruth suggests, well, that is what
they said in 1978 but times have changed. Maybe they do not need it anymore. Well, that argument, I think, ignores the fact that Congress has
amended FISA five times, including in 2001 in the Patriot Act, 24 including
in 2004, and never took out this directive that it is exclusive means. So, then
the question is Congress--does Congress have power to regulate the subject
22
23
24

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
United States v. Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-

cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 350-53 (2001).
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of electronic surveillance of Americans at home? I think the answer to that
is clearly yes under the Congress Clause, under the foreign Congress
Clause, with respect to the NSA, under its power to issue rules and regulations governing the Army and Navy, as the NSA is part of the military, and,
therefore, Congress, clearly, has authority to act here.
Now, it may well be that there some residual power that the Commander-in-Chief has that Congress could not override. I think, for example,
if Congress sought to put the authority to run the war in some other official,
outside the chain of command, that would violate the Commander-in-Chief
authority. But the notion that Congress can not limit electronic surveillance,
warrantless wiretapping of Americans at home simply because the President
is fighting a war, I think, is a radical notion and one that is not supported by
a single case-you do not have to go back to the original premise-from the
time of the founding of the Republic to today holds the President cannot
violate a criminal statute, even when exercising Commander-in-Chief
power. And, as I said in my opening remarks, the two most recent Supreme
Court decisions on point, Hamdi25 and Rasul, 26 both squarely rejected that
notion in the context of detention, which, if anything, is a fundamental incident of a war power is the detention of an enemy combatant and yet, the
Court said, Congress can act to limit the President's power and the courts
can act to review the President's exercising of it.
PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
If I may, Mr. Chairman, my unfounded prerogativePROFESSOR SCHARF.
Very briefly.
PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
Number one, FISA covers much more than Americans at home.
Anybody, anybody who is territorially in the U.S. The twentieth, the twenty
hijackers, the nineteen hijackers in the U.S. were covered by FISA, which
means that you may have combatants here who are foreign nationality, foreign domicile who have the benefit of being protected by the FISA Court.
Clearly, there are some marks of Executive power that could not be
trampled on by the Congress. If the Congress had said in World War II, that
when FDR was targeting a Nazi submarine because they were concerned
25
26

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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about the possibility of damage to whaling, the future of the whale population in the North Atlantic, that you have to go to a court and have the court
evaluate the predicate for knowing it was a Nazi submarine versus a whale,
surely, that would be seen as an invasion of the Commander-in-Chief
power, even though Congress has a valid interest in sustaining the whale
population.
So David has to admit that, in some circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief power, not only has implications vis-A-vis Congress's
power but the inappropriate use of our cardinal three courts, you should
think about the limits of Article 3, as well as the limits of Article 2.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
Senator Chodosh, you now have the floor.
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
Let's say that we concede that FISA is outdated and that legislative
moments are few and far between, but let's also think that we are currently
in a legislative moment in the wake of this controversy. Professor Wedgwood, what would you suggest be the primary amendments to FISA to
make it work more effectively? And then Professor Cole, if you could
comment on those suggestions and see which ones you would be willing to
accept.
PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
That is a hard question because, againASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
That is why I posed it.
PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
It is awfully hard because all what has been said by the administration is that there was one program, which consists of phone calls to or from
persons associated with Al-Qaeda. And I think you will have a very long
debate in the Congress to figure out how you characterize the necessary
predicate. There are a whole vocabulary and issues of search, search and
seizures counter to criminal law, where you have probable cause, we have
reasonable suspicion, we think about "Terry Stops", but we never had to
even think about this before the circumstance of, truly, catastrophic harm.
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So, I think you would have to reopen and have a very long debate
about probability versus harm with a one percent chance of a million people's death and sufficient as predicate. One percent chance this is Al-Qaeda,
a million people; this would not be an easy debate.
The second problem is that to make it fit, what could be necessary
iteration of some search procedures might require many legislative moments.
Third problem, I have never known a senator's staff to leak anything but to the senator. But the rule in Washington is the true one. If you
tell more than a dozen people, it's in The Washington Post the next day. It
just happens. And the difficulty in getting a tightly fitted statute, quite apart
from what may be important constitutional principles of the President's
inherent power to, is that to tightly fit the statute to the operation would
involve persuading, and, therefore, telling, a great many senators what the
program is and its operational details.
Senator Specter has suggested having the FISA Court be the one.
Go tell FISA and they will give you some kind of a group warrant or an
open-ended John Doe warrant to go and do likewise and the following kinds
of searches that have you go back to them. That is probably outside the Article 3 power of a judge. This is not the limit we thought of warrants in the
past.
So, I think that if there is going to be a legislative compromise, one
of the likeliest ways of that is to have a reporting requirement, either to the
big eight or to some kind of highly compartmentalized way the intelligence
committees-it is what the ultimate compromise was on the Lindsey Graham amendment on interrogation procedures.
But I think part of the problem with the net, part of the problem
with my pension plan stocks, my tech stocks, is that it is extremely hard to
anticipate how electronic communications are going to evolve, even within
a month-to-month circumstance. So to try to fit this to a dynamically changing technology, which extra-territorial, is going to be exceedingly difficult.
Even the proper name Al-Qaeda is difficult. Terrorist groups morph. You
can get around it with associates of Al-Qaeda, but what if we have another
group that was a national group but was also thought to be interested in the
same kind of catastrophic harm? Would you think of a proper name on the
statute or would simply say try to frame it in terms of the kind of activities
of terms of harm?
So it may well be-There is a book-no one reads his book anymore. It is a great book, I recommend it--Charles Mcllwain Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern.2 He makes the distinction between governments
and the jurisdictionality and governance; that congresses or parliaments tend
27

CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN
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to legislate in regard to things that admit of long-term solutions. Whereas
the Executive or, in case of the royal power, it is the thought of this being
what you need when it is, again, a kind of a dynamic circumstance where
you cannot anticipate, in advance, the iterations and permutations of both
things.
PROFESSOR COLE:
If I could respond. First of all, the notion that we face a truly catastrophic threat today, but did not in 1978 when we faced the world's second
most powerful superpower which had thousands of nuclear missiles trained
on every one of our cities, we did not face a catastrophic threat then? Sure,
we faced a catastrophic threat then probably a greater threat than we face
with respect to Al-Qaeda today, but certainly not a categorically different
and, therefore, requiring an entirely different rubric.
Secondly, when I listen to what Ruth said in response, I understood
her to be making two proposals, a reporting requirement; FISA already has
one. It requires the reporting every year to the intelligence committee of the
number of taps, the nature of the taps, the outcome of the taps and the like.
Third, she said we should not use names for terrorist organizations.
What if we have terrorist organizations that morph? FISA does not use
names. FISA defines a terrorist organization as a group of two or more people who engage in terrorism, which is very, very broadly defined. So that is
not a problem under the current law. So the two proposals that Ruth has
made are unnecessary because one is already in the law and the other is
basically Ruth's misunderstanding of the law.
Let me talk about what FISA permits because I think that helps you
understand what we might need in terms of changes. It permits any electronic surveillance that is collected abroad and targeted people abroad without regard to warrants, without regard to probable cause, without regard to
any standard whatsoever. So right now, the NSA can listen in on every
phone call of every person coming out of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, etc.;
FISA does not even touch that.
Secondly, when and only when information is acquired in the
United States or you target an American person within the United States,
then FISA kicks in. Then, it allows you to listen in on anyone who is a
member of a terrorist organization. You just have to show that the person's
a member. Shouldn't you have to show that? Ruth, in her opening remarks
said maybe probable cause is too high a standard. What is interesting to me
is that the administration said that the standard they are employing under
this program is probable cause. So they, apparently, the people who know
the facts, who have made the decision about what national security requires,
has said probable cause is okay by us. We just do not want to have to make
the showing to a judge. But if you have to make the showing of probable
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cause and you have to satisfy that objective criteria, what is the problem
with showing it to a judge, unless, in fact, what you are doing is saying that
you are applying probable cause when, in fact, you are not?
Now I think there could well be arguments that we might want to
reduce the level of suspicion that is appropriate when someone is thought to
be connected with the enemy during wartime. But again, the proper way to
do that is ask for FISA to be amended. There was a legislative moment. It
was called the Patriot Act, which the President asked for lots of changes to
FISA in the Patriot Act. He got them but because he thought he could not
get this one he decided to ignore the Patriot Act and violated criminal statute. That is not the way democracy works.
PROFESSOR WEDGWOOD:
A real quick repose to what is a point just so no one walks away
from the cold war quite so easily. On the issue of catastrophic harm. The
Cold War mutually assured destructive capabilities, a haunting phrase from
Dr. Strangelove. The Soviets knew we would strike back if they struck us.
Deterrence worked and we knew who the adversary was. There is no return
address with regard to Al-Qaeda. And therefore, you have to anticipate
things before they happen, which is an extraordinarily difficult task.
PROFESSOR SCHARF.
Senator Adler has the final question of the day.
PROFESSORJONATHAN ADLER:
Thank you, Senator Scharf. Professor Cole, earlier, a few moments
ago, you said there may well be portions of the Executive's Commander-inChief power that are beyond the scope of Congress's direct regulation. Is
there any doubt that, in fact, there is such a core of the Commander-in-Chief
power and could you give us some idea of what that core might be if it does
not include surveillance of potential enemies?
PROFESSOR COLE:
As I said, I think all the clause says is that the President shall act as
Commander-in-Chief, as the role of Commander-in-Chief, pursuant to a war
that Congress has authorized, governing an army whose rules and regulations Congress sets, not the President, using whatever army Congress gives
him. So it seems to me that the clear structural framework of the Constitution was we do not want to give the President a lot of power as Commanderin-Chief. But we do want to have a unitary source of authority for fighting
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the war. So, as I suggested earlier, if Congress violated that principle, by
putting someone else in charge or putting someone in charge of some aspect
of the war which is not subject to the Commander-in-Chief oversight, than
that might well be a violation, just as Voucher v. Sinar, taking away execution of the laws and giving it to somebody who was answerable to Congress, was a violation of separation of powers.
It seems to me that there are certain kinds of micromanaging of the
battlefield tactics that might well be seen as within the core. But I do not
think that issue is ever going to arrive because I do not think Congress
would ever seek to regulate that. I think you could imagine in certain situations that Ruth believes are within the core. I do not think warrantless wiretapping of Americans, without Congressional authority or judicial approval,
is one of them.
PROFESSOR ADLER:
We have already heard several mentions, Professor Cole, the 2000
Moss memorandum 28 that said the President's authority of national security
and intelligence would enable the President to violate Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,29 pursuant to that authority. Was
the Clinton Administration wrong in that memorandum?
PROFESSOR COLE:
I think that is a very a different situation. What you are really talking about there, what was at issue there was the grand jury secrecy provision, which says that you are not allowed to disclose information that you
obtained through the course of a grand jury investigation and it is a crime to
do so. The argument of the Clinton Administration, at least as I understand
it, was that for two reasons it does not really make sense to apply this to the
present.
The first is that the President is responsible for prosecuting the
laws. He is ultimately responsible. So when his prosecutor happens to be in
there, in the grand jury room, doing the investigation, he is the President. He
is the alter ego of the President. So sharing that information with the President is not a violation of the statute and it should not be understood to be a
violation statute. There is no indication that Congress intended the statute to
prohibit that kind communication. What it was designed to prohibit was
public communication of the secret goings-on of a grand jury. So this is a
28
29

Moss Memorandum, supra note 12.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
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statute that could be properly interpreted not to apply to that kind of communication, at least, when you are talking about a national security concern
that is the President's constitutional duty to respond to it.
The difference here, of course, is that there is no argument, in fact,
the administration has not even suggested, given the arguments that they
have made, you think that they might make this argument, they have not
even made this argument, it is so ludicrous. There is no argument that FISA
is not intended to prohibit warrantless wiretapping of Americans for foreign
intelligence purpose during war beyond the first fifteen days of the conflict
because Congress made it very clear this was about regulating the president's wiretapping. They specifically addressed the question of warrantless
wiretapping during wartime. They specifically put a limit on it and they
made it a crime. That is very different from the grand jury provision, which
I think, could be reasonably understood not to prohibit the President's alter
ego from sharing with the President, the information that is at issue when
national security is involved.
PROFESSORADLER:
Really briefly, I have the memorandum. It says that Title III cannot,
constitutionally, be applied to preclude such disclosure. Is not that an argument that, in fact, the law would be unconstitutional, in so far as it prevented the President from exercising his authority in this way and is that not
the argument that, I think, Senator Roberts has made against FISA?
PROFESSOR COLE:
Yes, that is the argument, but essentially, is a very, very different
context when you are talking about a general statute which there is no evidence that it was intended to preclude the president from talking to his inferior about the information. The inferior was acting on the President's authority in prosecuting where there is every bit of evidence to indicate this statute
was designed to directly regulate the President's authority and, I think, under the Jackson analysis, the President's action is at his lowest ebb. I do not
think the President's action was at its lowest ebb in U.S. History before.

